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Introduction
Since Donald Cressey’s work on the Mafia as the ‘fifth estate’ (Cressey 1969), organised
crime as a direct threat to the legitimate state is squarely on crime/governance agendas
(Findlay 2008, Chap. 3). Politicians and criminal justice administrations in Australia (and
the Asia Pacific region), over the last decade in particular, have represented the organised
crime ‘menace’ as an attack on the institutions of the democratic state as well as a physical
and financial danger to society (Findlay 1986, 2000). With the recent and particular law
enforcement convergence between organised crime and terrorist funding, the implications
for governance are argued in crime control terms. This paper seeks to challenge the
theoretical assumptions that:
& organised crime is antithetical to the legitimate state;
& organised crime sits well with terrorism, particularly directed against the state or
international political alliances; and that
& these forms of terrorism and their support frameworks rely on financing through
organised crime in whole or in part.1
Aligning organised crime with challenges to state authority and institutions is consistent
with the approaches of governments in the United States and Italy when constructing the
‘reality’ of the Mafia in their countries for more than a century (Smith 1975), and the
representation of organised crime ‘colonisation’ in the transitional Eastern European states
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1The notion and nature of terrorism generalised throughout this paper is concerned with violent attacks on
state and alliance institutions and ideologies. It is not interested in terrorist violence that is employed
directly for economic motives or that which is an extension of violence as a tool or organised criminal
enterprise within black market counter-economies (see Findlay 1999, Chap. 5).
This paper is not a detailed denial of the difference between organised crime as the aggregation of illicit wealth,
and terrorism which may not be concerned with economic profit. It takes as given the primary political
context for terrorism and the enterprise environment of organised crime.
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(Findlay 1999). More recently, an assumed connection has been drawn between organised
crime and international terrorism, with similar political purposes in mind but now the threat
is determined against global governance (Findlay 2008). This paper critically evaluates this
assumption in the context of para-politics.
Beneath the suggested contest between organised crime and the state, are more complex
and less apparent mutual interests at a ‘deep state’ level.2 Significant evidence exists that
during the ‘cold war’ period in Europe, transitional state conflict3 alliances have been
forged between organised criminal enterprise and para-political movements in order to
destabilise state governance and thereby reap benefit.4 Terrorist violence has featured in
these alliances. In contemporary international relations, global terrorism is often directed
against the economic and cultural ideologies of Western ‘liberal’ democracies. This paper
asks whether, in Australia and the Asia Pacific region, there exist the political and cultural
conditions that would foster co-operation between organised criminal enterprise and
politically motivated terrorist violence.
International relations critically declares the new age of globalisation (Baumann 1998;
Findlay 2008) concerned with risk and security worldwide as the major era of global
terrorism (Findlay 2003). At the same time, organised crime is now cast as a trans-national,
cross-border problem, with alliances returning to the distinctly political.5 In global terrorism,
the world is said to be confronting a new organised crime opportunity, the local
manifestations of which are inextricably linked to international conflict, and the threat is
directed against global communities (Findlay 2004). To control terrorism these communities
must sever the financial link with organised crime.
This paper commences with a discussion of terrorism as contemporary organised crime.6
The common characteristics of terrorism and other forms of organised crime are suggested
in a broad consideration of enterprise theory.7 The importance of globalisation in
stimulating organised crime as terrorism is then developed. In this phase of globalisation,
negotiating risk and security has necessarily been pre-determined by the prevailing political
concern with international terror.8 The nexus between globalisation, terrorism and organised
crime is referred to and its consequences for countries like Australia are identified.
Australia’s reaction to terrorism, both local and global, is critiqued and comment is made on
2 For a discussion of the deep state and para politics, see Tunander 2006.
3 Examples are provided in Reno 2006.
4 These benefits may have the common outcome of overturning state authority but may be motivated by
distinctly different purposes and often with opposing eventual expectations.
5 This is not new. An examination of the historical literature on the triads in Nationalist China clearly locates
the connection between organised crime organisations and financing with contesting political movements.
6 The link between organised crime and terrorism is not necessarily a new phenomenon. On the contrary,
the earliest identified manifestations of organised crime in Europe, China, and even Japan, demonstrated a
motivation to undermine and overthrow established rule. In fact, triads were, at the turn of the nineteenth
century, bound up with the Nationalist struggle in China. The difference today is that the international
nature of organised crime as terrorism is clearly directed against global political cultures, influences and
domination.
7 Due to limitations of space, enterprise theory is introduced only as a preferred paradigm for distinguishing
the economic motivations of organised crime from the ideological and political imperatives of global
terrorism.
8 Some argue that without the strange conflation between fundamental Islamists and the neo-conservatives in
the United States (and the terror that emerges from this) then the disengagement from conventional politics
would be much more universal. (See the documentary ‘The Power of Nightmares’ screened by SBS
Television in 2007).
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the similarities in the way both organised crime and now terrorism (as the great threats to
‘Australian values’, as well as to global community) have fostered radical responses from
the state. We conclude by predicting how globalisation (and terrorism as one of its
contemporary characteristics) is influencing the appreciation of organised crime in Australia
and the Asian region.
Throughout the paper, the analysis of connections between organised crime/terrorism/
governance is at both state and ‘deep state’ levels. Regarding the ‘deep state’, there is the
recognition that there exists in the contemporary world a powerful clandestine relationship
between the security and intelligence organisations of established states, international
criminal networks, and ‘quasi states’ in the form of separatist movements or some terrorist
organisations. These ‘alternative state’ entities challenge sovereignty, economy, monopolies
of force, and the whole protectionist fabric of the established state. Organised criminal
enterprise may find a home within these movements, in similar ways to its infiltration of
state administration through corruption and black economies (Findlay 1994, 2004). In the
‘deep state’ relationship, the challenge of organised crime to democratic governance is
clearest.
Despite these empathies between organised crime, terrorism and state re-formation, the
unique insight offered by this paper is to confine commonality between organised crime
and terrorism to the level of enterprise (as distinct from any shared ideologies), while
critiquing the link between crime financing and terror as often no more than circumstantial.
If the foundations of terrorist funding are not principally or essentially organised crime,
then where and why has this assumed connection developed? The answer may lie more
likely in the way organised crime and terrorism have been represented by the state and its
control agencies, as threats to democratic governance. Challenging this nexus will naturally
open up other platforms for contesting political legitimacy through terrorism now simply
dismissed as a consequence of criminalisation (Findlay 2008, Chap. 4).
The first stage towards these conclusions is to review law enforcement associations
between organised crime and hegemonic political distinctions of global terrorism (Findlay
2008, Chap. 5). It is a short step from conventional representations of organised crime, we
suggest, to a dangerous alliance with global terror if the moral rather than the economic
orientations of each is under-emphasised.
Common Characteristics of Organised Crime
Smith (1975) argues that organised crime is the product, not the cause, of forces that
threaten values. In this regard, if society or the state countenances violence, considers
personal gain to be more important than equity, and is willing to see the law distorted in the
pursuit of wealth and power, then such a society or state itself will always be receptive to
illicit enterprise whether condoned, ignored or condemned. Such enterprise will become a
reality whenever a group of people are willing to take advantage of entrepreneurial
opportunities that entail selective law enforcement, violence and corruption to achieve
commercial gain (Fiorentini & Peltzman, 1995).
When analysing the conventional ‘official account’ of organised crime in Australia (as
with the United States and Italy) it is interesting to note consistency in imagery. Organised
crime is:
& the ‘fifth estate’ (a direct challenge to the authority of government);
& the merchants of terror working towards the theft of a nation;
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& the ‘bankers’ for terrorism; or
& the corruptors of democratic government.
Each such representation involves a mixture of the following:
& a subversion of state interests;
& a degree of organised criminal enterprise;
& a potential for violence;
& a deviant counter culture in terms of morality and collective endeavour;
& commercial power and influence both in the licit and the illicit sense (Passas & Nelken,
1993); and
& a threat, whether immediate or long term, to the security of the individual or to the
peace and good order of the community.
If organised crime or acts of terrorism are deemed to be challenges to the legitimacy of
the state, then governments will move to counter the challenge by neutralising the
ideological impetus of the opposition, as much as it will move to neutralise the active threat
posed thereby (Findlay 2004). In this process, governments devalue the currency of the
ideologies in contest, therefore giving them less opportunity to exchange, move or trade
their ideas.
Continuing the theme of enterprise, states can devalue a currency to reduce inflation (of
an idea in this case). In today’s international political climate, the proliferation of particular
ideologies is often attacked in this way, i.e. reducing credence and devaluing or building
blocks of the ideology (Findlay & Henham, 2005). For example, when religious
fundamentalists talk about terror attacks as ‘holy war,’ the victim cultures retaliate by
reinterpreting these acts as illegitimate violence. A central device in such a process of
neutralisation is to define the actions of the opposition as only criminal (Matza 1964),
hence devaluing or delegitimising the claims of proponents who cite provocation by
aggressive cultures as the inevitable reason for violence.
This control strategy becomes more complicated when the state, realising the unique
nature of the terrorist threat, but not wishing to place it outside the rhetoric of criminality,
chooses to compromise or exaggerate the more usual processes of criminal justice, rather
than give credence to the claims of the terrorist through an ongoing military response.
A recent Australian example has been the enactment of anti-terrorist legislation in the
most populous State, New South Wales. The Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002 created a
new crime on top of kidnapping, bombing, hijacking, and the widespread destruction of
property, which have been offences for ages. The offence of terrorism combines and
exacerbates predetermined harms and this is the justification for a radical legislative
reaction. The special feature of the Act is to give the police power to intrude without
warrants against ‘targets’ that might involve whole classes of people and collections of
premises. Such powers are largely exempt from challenge by the courts and can extend for
days. Expanded search powers are built on the general authority of the police and other
more recently empowered investigation agencies (Findlay et al. 2005, Chap. 3). They are
highly discretionary and, despite the attempt to exclude legitimate industrial and political
protest from the powers of the Act, similar behaviours might in fact identify a target group.
The violations of civil rights9 (otherwise protected by the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, signed and ratified by Australia) include arbitrary detention and
9 In their common law and legislative forms in New South Wales, or as protected through the administrative
guidelines governing police practice.
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invasion of privacy, even against particular vulnerable communities in Australia. These
rights invasions do not need to be justified by a specific act; they can be pre-emptive, and
need to be supported by nothing more than ‘reasonable cause’ as determined by the police.
Particular powers such as the strip-searching of children challenge international covenants
such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, despite legislative
justification. All this is legitimised against a criminal threat posed by international
terrorism, as yet of unclear significance within Australia’s ‘local’ jurisdiction.
The utility of the criminal sanction in controlling terrorism, like organised crime, rests
with the acceptance by the community that radical modifications to ‘due process’ are
necessary as part of contemporary legitimate government, and an essential utilitarian
response to the unique threat posed. The same conditions apply to exceptional laws against
organised crime from strong states with a commitment to responsible internationalism
(Viano 1999). Any popular criticism of the radical control response is restricted not to
issues of legitimacy, but rather to whether the legislation and new law enforcement
framework will succeed in its express control objectives.
Sophisticated comparative levels of analysis (local, regional and global) are notably
absent from assertions about organised crime and terrorist funding. If the developing nature
of organised criminal enterprise for Australia, the Asian region, and internationally is to be
realistically, and less dispassionately, confronted, the analysis of crime and globalisation is
productive (Findlay 1999, Chap. 5; Findlay 2008). International pressures toward
modernisation see regional and international criminal enterprise exploit the instability
attendant on economic transition and cultural conflict, in order to promote conventional
crime business.10
Established sources of illegitimate finance and capital are now widely suspected by law
enforcement as bank-rolling violent struggles for political and cultural change (McCulloch
et al. 2004). Even so, there is little evidence-based research outside operational
‘intelligence’ to confirm crime as the major source of terrorist funding (certainly beyond
its international manifestations).11 If so, then why has the organised crime/terrorism
connection become part of the language of international policing?
The more convincing investigations of organised crime recognise its enterprise structure
(Burchfield 1978; Van Duyne 1993), and the trans-national commerce/profit on which it
relies (Findlay 1999, pp 49–52). This analysis emerges in part from an appreciation of
organised crime as the provision of goods and services in illicit markets, the infiltration of
state and legitimate markets through corruption, and the creation and financing of quasi-
legitimate business enterprises (Volkov 2002). This ‘business style’ parallels the role of
organised crime in servicing slum settlements in place of the state12 and the community
building of alleged terrorist groups in failing states such as Lebanon (Napoleoni 2005).
Here, the division between organised crime and the state, and their respective location in
illegitimate and legitimate economies, is far from convincing (Findlay 1999).
Take, for instance, the enterprise preference in criminal organisations for illicit drug
trafficking, and the ‘business’ and political interconnections this requires. In recent times,
the integral relationships between organised illicit drug trade and the domestic and
international interests of powerful states has been convincingly chartered (McCoy 1973). In
10 Volkov’s (2002) intriguing examination of the place of protection and extortion rackets in the emerging
Russian private marketplace exemplifies this trend.
11 Indeed, it seems that organised ‘philanthropic’ contributions from ‘off-shore’ communities play a more
significant and constant role in financing organisations and movements suspected of terrorist involvement.
12 See the discussion of the favelas in Brazil—Findlay and Zvekic 1993.
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this setting it is the legitimate as opposed to the ‘deep state’ that marries organised crime for
mutual benefit.13
Without a concentration on the ‘business’ focus of organised crime, and the distinctive
political/ideological imperatives of global terrorism, it becomes easier to merge both within
representations of racialisation and exclusion. Considering organised crime (and interna-
tional terrorism as its alleged dependant) in terms of enterprise and profit motives, avoids
the unfortunate distractions of racism, xenophobia, and mysticism pervading the official
literature on both phenomena (Van Duyne 1996). By simply accepting this conventional
analysis from law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Australia and its allies,
organised crime is the province of Asian crime gangs, Middle Eastern youth, Italian
families, or Russian gangsters (Poynting et al. 2004, pp 53–54). In these terms neither
organised crime nor terrorism are ‘home-grown’, always appearing as an external infection,
emanating from those cultures which ‘white Australia’ (and the neo-conservative West in
general) fears. Compatible with the nature and origins of legitimate international trading
and enterprise, this representation is not the reality, and its distortion makes researching and
regulating organised crime and terrorism all the more difficult (Findlay 1994).
Assuming international terrorism as a new incarnation of organised crime suffers from
similar misrepresentation. In Australia, for instance, terrorism and organised crime control
strategies have been appropriated one to the other in a climate of ‘war’ rhetoric, wherein
criminal justice is engaged and widely compromised (Findlay 2001). Investigation
institutions such as the Australian Crime Commission, and the Australian Federal Police
carry cross-over mandates to control organised crime and terrorism in the name of national
security. Terrorist funding has emerged as the bridge for this law enforcement convergence.
It is more productive to expose terrorism funding and its organisation to enterprise theory
(located within crime or politics), than to base law enforcement on popular culture mythologies
about shared challenges to the state. To achieve this it is necessary to interrogate the ‘profit’
motivation for the terrorist enterprise from material wealth (as with drug trafficking) to political
power and cultural influence in their broadest senses, which may in turn have their material
byproducts. Certainly, the critical stages of terrorist enterprises can be qualified as profit driven. In
so doing, the simplistic distinction between criminal and political formulations is challenged and
exposed. This is rarely recognised in attempts to regulate money laundering and to confiscate
criminal assets as an upstream effort to stem the funding of terrorism. But even with recent
Australian legislative initiatives such as the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act 2002
(Commonwealth of Australia), the unquestioned link between crime capital and terrorism is not
critically addressed (McCulloch et al. 2004).
We have argued that one sure way to appreciate the actual motivations of organised crime
is in the application of enterprise theory (Findlay 2004). Another consequence of this analysis
is the critical edge to test assumed connections between organised crime and terrorism.
Through the prism of enterprise theory the best that could be said for any such relationship is
that economic profit is a shared platform from which distinctly different objectives are
sought. Seen in its limited context, away from political and ideological imperatives, the
application of enterprise theory to terrorism as organised crime offers the possibility to:
& disentangle ideology from action;
& understand the stages and locations of a ‘trade’ in terror;
13 This also gives weight to Napoleoni’s caution that the distinction between state and non-state actors may
be false and misleading. In some situations alleged terror organisations such as the PLO and Hamas have
larger and more community interconnected bureaucracies and finances than do the ‘shell states’ in which
they locate (Napoleoni 2005, p 67).
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& identify and appreciate the material motivations for terrorist attacks;
& expose and regulate the financing of terrorism, which maybe distinct from the
religious, cultural and political motivations for terrorism;
& understand why certain phases of a terrorist event and its organisational
infrastructure locate in particular jurisdictions; and
& follow the pathways of communication crucial for a terrorist event, and better
understand the selection of victims for terrorist attack, and their vulnerability.
If possible, a limited, evidenced-based organised crime model for terrorism, emphasising
the structural cross-over between legitimate and illegitimate commercial enterprise
supporting acts of terror, rather than their immorality, also qualifies the extent to which
criminal justice should be involved in terrorist regulation rather than military or other
political control agendas (Dickie 1994). The intention of the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is clearly to encourage similar international
criminal justice responses as those now directed to corruption and to money laundering, and
consequently against the resourcing of terrorism (Tan 2003). The problem with this
approach to terrorist financing is its over adoption, and its capacity to tar even spontaneous
and politically motivated terrorist violence with a common financial brush. In terms of
international politics, an explanation for this lies in the place of criminalisation in efforts to
delegitimise contesting ideologies (Findlay 2008).
If terrorism is crime rather than war or revolution, then the activity of various states in
selectively promoting one type of terror against another might be more clearly critiqued. If
terrorism is distinctly integrated within other criminal enterprise (such as arms smuggling,
identity fraud, and money laundering) then, to a limited extent, effective market regulators
may be employed in its control, even where violence is the currency for trade (Findlay 1986).
Conventional Representations of Organised Crime—Lessons for the Interpretation
of Terrorism
Awidespread and prevailing interest in crime is a desire at community levels for simple and
convincing evaluations of crime problems. So saying, the ‘local wisdom’ about crime is
both problematic and indicative. While usually failing to provide a sufficient understanding
of crime in context, this ‘wisdom’ goes a long way towards identifying what is troubling
people about crime, and where, and in what form, it is feared. Current media concerns in
Australia about Asian organised crime reveal a prevailing racism in the Australian
community. For example, these representations implicitly hark back to the ‘white Australian
policy’ of the 1950s, and have not been efficiently countered through decades of political
ascription to multi-culturalism.
The relationships, dynamics and consequences of crime are derived mainly from popular
impressions, rather than critical scholarly analysis. Popular impressions determine climates
of fear and isolation, which impact on the quality of life within communities. This harm is
more so than actual crime victimisation, particularly when the latter, as with September 11,
is embraced locally and internationally.
All too often the desire to know more about crime within communities has been satisfied
by misleading political and law-enforcement discourse, or academic equivocation. Partial or
unbalanced ‘understandings’ of crime, in these arguments themselves become a significant
variable in crime situations, thereby influencing the shape it assumes and the effect it
renders its essential relationships.
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The interests behind the almost chronic misrepresentations of organised crime (see
Findlay 1992) have the power to endorse, as well as deny its significant and constant
justification for or against social change. However, the analysis of organised crime both in
its local and international setting has the potential to unmask these interests and thereby
challenge the misconceived stories about such crime. For instance, the popular
representation of cannabis cultivation in southern New South Wales (NSW) in the 1960s
was as an Italian conspiracy inextricably connected with Calabria. By examining crime
relationships in real settings of southern NSW (and comparing this with southern Italy), the
actual enterprise was both more tangible and dynamic. It involved a trade network locally,
and a drugs and capital climate beyond Australia, but not essentially pre-determined by
ethnicity, migration or Mafia mystique (Findlay 1992).
Organised Crime as the Banker for Terrorism
There is much contemporary law enforcement speculation at regional and international
levels which declares that organised crime is a crucial fund for terrorism. Occasional
evidence of money-laundering associated with terrorism, or the transfer of criminal assets to
terrorist organisations and enterprises has tended to justify a prevailing law enforcement
conviction that by regulating crime cash flows, terrorism will be denied. However, there are
a number of simple observations concerning organised crime and terrorism that might test
this assumption:
& as with organised crime, it is too simplistic and misleading to universalise terrorism and
terrorist organisation. A crucial distinction, and one which might have a direct influence
over whether a terrorist enterprise requires external resourcing, is if the organisation
behind the terrorist event controls territory or commercial assets;
& some terrorist events are sporadic, spontaneous, individualised, and require little by the
way of money to promote and achieve their objectives;
& many terrorist organisations are aligned with recognised or legitimate political
movements and gain financial assistance through shared resources;
& other organisations which are referred to as having terrorist aims, or terrorist alliances, may
gain benefit from donations to over-arching religious or resistance movements;
& some terrorists and their organisations are also active in criminal activity for profit;
& however, the proceeds of crime which result are as much directed to the maintenance of
individual lifestyles as they are to further terrorist activity;
& organised crime and terrorism may benefit financially and politically through
destabilised market structures, without generating identifiable and mutually supportive
cash transfer relationships; and finally
& many terrorists and the organisations they sponsor are independently wealthy through
legitimate business or transferred wealth and this legitimate capital base can be
redirected to funding terrorism, or not, as the case may be.
If criminal enterprise is not the crucial and distinctive financial supplement to terrorist
enterprise, and if not all significant terrorist activity requires external funding, the effort to
defeat terrorism though the organised crime route is at best misdirected. This realisation
should have the capacity to require law enforcement to individually justify rather than
automatically assume that following the money trail will deny the terrorist the essence of
their endeavour.
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It is arguable, as has been regularly revealed in organised crime capital and financial
arrangements, that examining connections with legitimate banking and financial services
might be as productive when it comes to understanding (for the sake of control) terrorist
funding. The stories of terrorist groups using drug trafficking, vice, illegal immigration,
identity fraud and poaching to raise resources are unfortunately more populist than the
mundane realities of political and religious sponsorship.
In any case the remaining connections between organised crime profit and terrorist
financing may not be causal. Organised crime and terrorist organisations will employ
common criminal enterprise for their own quite separate motivations. A good example of
this is the illegal arms trade. Organised crime profits from the manufacture, sale and
marketing of illicit arms. Terrorists benefit from the trade and may gain ancillary profit
from facilitating arms transfer among different terrorist cells. Connected to this is shared
training and knowledge transfer, which will make possible greater terror capacity. The
complexity of this trade and mutual assistance challenges a simple causal interpretation of
crime proceeds and terrorist resourcing.
As mentioned earlier, organised crime might not be the great terror bank, but the
business methods which it employs and the impact on fragile states and fledgling free
markets deserves the tag of terrorism in many instances.
Organised Crime as Terrorism
Classifying terrorism as a special form of organised crime facilitates and justifies state
intervention at a civil level, as constitutional, politically responsible and necessary. Such an
approach, while supportive of state authority, ignores the often intricate and diverse
organisation behind politically and ideologically motivated terrorism and its transient
interconnections with other less violent forms of organised crime. This is particularly so
when cross-border and organisationally complex global terrorism exhibits and relies on the
international enterprise networks essential for other forms of trans-national organised crime,
such as drug trafficking, people-smuggling and identity fraud. It also confounds
spontaneous, disorganised, anarchistic, and often as such more dangerous terrorism
phenomena such as ‘copy-cat’ catastrophes, which can have no reliance on organised
crime financing.
In Australia, the state’s response to organised crime and more recent terrorism presents
similarities:
& both have been identified as new and vital threats;
& largely from external sources but with local manifestations;
& requiring tough legislation giving new powers to law enforcement agencies, and
restricting conventional citizen’s rights, and
& justified by the argument that if tough measures are not taken then whole communities
and life-styles will suffer.
Legislative reaction has been extreme, and the conventional rights of the suspect are an
early casualty in directing criminal justice towards national security.14
The current representation of terrorism features the same ‘war on crime’ discourse that
was characteristic of state responses throughout the last century to organised crime,
14 For a brief outline of recent Commonwealth legislative and administrative activity in the area of national
security see Findlay et al. 2005 pp 100–105.
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particularly drug trafficking (Chambliss 1989). In the same vein, the obligation to join in an
international alliance attacking global terror mirrors the debate behind the UN Convention
against Trans-national Organised Crime at the turn of this century.
New levels of law enforcement cooperation across borders have been fostered in this
climate of acute threat and exaggerated retaliation (Viano 1999). By concentrating on the
violent and intimidatory behaviours of organised crime and terrorism, rather than on their
organisational structures or expressed motivations, the community is more ready to accept
strong medicine to prevent terror in its midst. Interestingly, the state has employed the
‘terror’ of fear concept to facilitate what might otherwise be law enforcement responses that
would meet vocal resistance (McCulloch 2003).
Up to this point we have been concentrating on local or jurisdictional responses to what
is a now defined as an international threat. It is important in order to understand the way in
which a state like Australia has responded to global terrorism as crime, to consider the
impact of globalisation in defining the organised criminal behaviour of terrorism, the threat
it poses and the obligation imposed on ‘legitimate states’ to join the global ‘war on terror’.
How does terror target the state?
Terrorism and the Challenge to the State
Loretta Napoleoni in Terror Incorporated: Tracing the dollars behind terror networks,
looks at Pierson’s The Modern State, to distil from his nine characteristics of the state, four
that are shared by terrorist organisations or ‘shell states’. These are:
& a monopoly on the means of violence
& territoriality
& taxation, and
& public bureaucracy
The other indicia (sovereignty, constitutionality, the rule of law, impersonal power, and
the legitimacy of authority and citizenship) may not only be missing from the terrorist
project but they may form the objectives of its violent endeavour.
However, as suggested earlier, what comprises the authorised state, particularly in times of
weakness, transition, and conflict, may not be distinctive from the ‘deep state’ within, and the
terrorists it sometimes employs. An important feature of para-political analysis is to treat as
state-like entities a whole range of organisations and institutions which at first may not
conventionally classify as states. In doing this, the simplistic dichotomy between states and the
organised crime/terrorism threat said to be pitted against them takes on a more politically
conditional appearance. These ‘state-like entities’ (direct challenges to the state or not) include:
1. covert organisations, semi-autonomous intelligence agencies, secret societies and
power elites which may be well ingrained into the authorised state institutions;
2. criminal structures and enterprises, which exist in parallel symbiosis with the state and
may sponsor it, or have its patronage;
3. revolutionary and terrorist movements dedicated to the overthrow of the authorised state,
seeking territorial control and sovereignty as well as eventual moral and legal standing.
Recognising the growing power of these groups, particularly in drug trafficking and
terrorism, and their ‘politicisation’, it is strained to talk of their activities and their
consequences as either outside the state, or diametrically opposed to legitimate state interests.
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It is the complex interconnection between states, weak states, deep states and shell states
that challenges the representation of organised crime and terrorism as always and only in
contest with authorised state interests. Certainly, if we are to concentrate on the economic
dimensions of organised criminal enterprise and its involvement with deep state/terrorist
projects then the challenge to state institutions and processes posed by such groups is more
even and significant. In 1988, the IMF estimated that illicit funds worldwide amounted to
between US $800 billion and $2 trillion. In some states the black economy exceeds the
formal economy in GNP terms as well as capital reserves. In Asia it is not uncommon for
much more money in foreign remittances to pass through the informal rather than formal
banking sectors.
The tri-partite relationship between deep state institutions within authorised states,
criminal networks, and quasi-state projects is systematic, broad based and influential. This
means that a simple push by law enforcement to crack the link between terrorism and
organised crime financing will not have a long lasting influence on the stability of
governance under attack from without and within.
Globalisation and Terrorism
Essentially characteristic of globalisation, international crime is moving further away from
conventional explanations of criminality, despite political imperatives to the contrary, such
as those discussed above. The assumed but problematic and specific connection between
organised crime finance and global terror supports this conclusion. The same might be said
of the definition and understanding of organised crime and terrorism, particularly within
multinational economies (Block 1991; Block & Chambliss, 1981)
Critical to both globalisation and globalised crime is the internationalisation of capital, the
generalisation of consumerism, deregulation and the unification of economies. If crime is to be
understood as a market condition then its place within globalisation becomes more vital in
analysing contemporary appreciations of crime and control. So too terrorism as a
disproportionate ‘organised crime’ concern on the international agenda, cannot be disengaged
from the international relations that are the product of modernisation (Gilpin 1987).
The transitional economies of Eastern Europe have demonstrated the symbiosis between
organised crime, emergent private markets, and weak state regulation. With these
conditions present, criminal enterprise facilitates the market and benefits from capital
generation in legitimate and illegitimate market settings.
As with the crime and development nexus in general (Findlay 1999, Chap. 2), in
conflict-ridden and post-conflict cultures terrorism can be a force in state formation.
Terrorism and organised crime may come into contact as promoters of both political and
economic change. Where states are stronger and legitimate markets more resilient, capital
generated through organised crime may support political terrorism as it works to undermine
state forms which in turn will create unstable market conditions in which organised crime
will further flourish. Globalisation also pressures for cultural domination and in this way
may either benefit from or contest organised crime and terrorism in a global setting.
In its harmonious conceptualisation, globalisation tends to universalise crime problems
and generalise control responses. In this respect it complements and is complemented by
the organised crime rhetoric of international law enforcement.15 The simplification and
15 This rhetoric is picked up and promoted by Australian enforcement agencies with a brief to investigate
organised crime—see National Crime Authority 1996, Annual Report, NCA, Melbourne
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generalisation of organised crime in terms of common threats rather than unique enterprises
supports control strategies reliant on more law enforcement powers rather than their
diversification.
The unity of globalisation is as yet more convincing at a symbolic level. Crime
represents unequivocal symbols around which global ethics are confirmed, such as the war
against terror and its partial interpretation of democracy (Findlay 2004). Crime control
claims an irrefutable mandate for global order and a symbolic terrain across which order
rules. Consistently, the internationalisation of law enforcement responsibility for organised
crime has ranged from the symbolic—and required of national jurisdictions an
unambiguous (and largely uncritical) commitment—to a common language and prob-
lematisation of the organised crime menace in particular (Block & Chambliss, 1981)
The Local and the Global—Terrorism as an Organised Crime Threat in Australia
There is much about the representation of crime as a global problem16 which implies a
more structural set of relationships than do the localised representations of crime as people
and actions. There has been a recent trend in Australia and internationally, to move the
conceptualisation of organised crime away from ‘bosses’, through ethnic and family
groupings, onto enterprises (cartels, syndicates, networks). The depersonalisation of
organised crime has transferred the control focus from the jurisdictional to the global,
and has recognised the structural agility of criminal enterprises. This agility (and durability)
explains the perpetuation of organised crime even when local control operations
successfully prosecute the individual (see Robb 1996). With terrorism, the control talk is
about cells in networks, and while the ‘Mr Bigs’ of terror evade capture, the organisations
which they are said to lead (and their financing) is both an international and local law
enforcement endeavour.
It is the threat posed both by terrorism and organised crime that motivates local
jurisdictions to adopt international control agendas. Normally this would be resisted on the
basis of the autonomy of criminal justice as a state domain even in the face of international
crime threats (Findlay 1995). By concentrating on representations of organised crime and
terrorism, as well as the state response through criminalisation, local authorities have
translated the international significance of crime threat to justify local interventions which
may have little real impact within the jurisdiction concerned. This is an example of the
impact of internationalism on localised/criminal justice policy.
Social Situations of Organised Crime/Terrorism in Australia and Beyond
Viewing global representations of organised crime as against actual social relationships
which foster criminal enterprise (Robb 1996), any useful analysis will concentrate on the
social “situation” of crime rather than elusive and unconvincing speculation about causes,
16 In referring to a problem as global, the interpretations of Galtung (1995, p 29) are useful:
– global in the sense of “worldwide”, being shared by a high number of societies
– global in the sense of “world-interconnected”, with causal loops spanning the whole world
– global in the sense of “world-system”, applying to world society as such.
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consequences and trends. It is from a culturally specific grounding that explanations are
possible as to why:
...certain forms of behaviour become prohibited by criminal law and are defined as
‘crime’; certain acts and persons are selected by, and become subject to processes of
law enforcement; certain acts and persons are fitted with the label ‘criminal’ through a
process of adjudication; and criminal ‘identity’ is maintained, developed and
transformed through the interpretation and reaction of others (see Hester & Elgin,
1992, pp 11–12).
In Australia today, it seems that the community’s preferred perception of organised crime
and terrorism as the product of foreign, violent and subversive cultures serves as the
justification for the style and direction of law enforcement. Crime targeting in Sydney, for
instance, is presently directed against certain ethnic communities and youth cultures.
Australian enforcement authorities have adopted an American approach to the organised
crime menace, and American popular culture has influenced community understanding of
that menace as a local and global phenomenon.
Mafia-style mystique supports the community’s need for a distinction between the ‘real
criminals’ and the rest of society (see Box 1983). Such a distinction has been shaped into a
series of firm expectations about Mafia-style organised crime, and Al-Qieda-style terrorism.
By simplifying, generalising and thus mystifying organised crime, the complexity and
ubiquitous influence of organised criminal activity, and its link with capital at all levels of
commercial and economic life, is obfuscated (Findlay 1992). Whether it is the Australian or
world ‘mafias’, commonality in representation, enforcement practice, political discourse
and community appreciation of the menace tends to support and confirm an image of
organised crime which is at once local and global.
As long as organised crime is understood as an alien conspiracy dominated by ethnic
groups, it will remain difficult to understand how it actually operates. Effective state control
incursion into organised crime, and more particularly regionally sourced terrorism as it
touches Australia, depends on analysis that rejects or avoids these stereotypes.
As mentioned previously, concepts of crime have traditionally relied on some cultural or
jurisdictional situation for their relevance and impact. Implicit in this is the expectation that
crime stops at national borders, or at least that it has localised interests.
The jurisdictional boundaries of crime, however, can only be explained in terms of legal
convenience and legislative limits. As piracy, smuggling, abduction, gun-running, and
counterfeiting have been crime problems for centuries, so too the laws of individual nations
have been largely powerless to control them.
Trans-national crime such as terrorism is new only in its technologies and reach, along
with the manner in which law enforcement and international agencies have recently identified
it as a priority. Again, the selective political representation of crime is the explanation for such
a trend. For instance, as governments realise the potential for criminal enterprise to endanger
world market structures, capital transfer, national security, and international transport and
communication, crime targets are selected out for cooperative action while others, like
environmental degradation on a scale well beyond the reach of harm ever caused through
terror attacks, are largely ignored. Strategies have been developed for example, to prevent and
prosecute commodity futures fraud and abuses, but an international approach to crimes
against the environment is yet to be convincingly settled.
The other difference with trans-national crime, represented as a recent problem for
globalisation, is the manner in which crime control is reshaped in order to address the
difficulties with jurisdiction. Crime control is, in this context, at least a bi-lateral endeavour.
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However, in many control strategies for trans-national crime the bi-lateral efforts are
stimulated by globalised representations of crime and control priorities.
Australian criminal justice will become more interconnected within globalised crime
control agendas into the new millennium, despite its current commitment to America’s
preference for bi-lateralism and autonomy. International criminal law is developing as a
new and expansive level of legal regulation. It will support an international criminal justice
process, within which Australia will become subsumed, which will not simply rely on
discrete operational justifications such as war crimes, or organised crime. To this extent, all
crime will have a trans-national potential and a globalised response. The essential
interaction between local and global crime concerns will be the predominant feature of
Australian criminal justice into the next century. Organised crime as terrorism cannot but
help being a priority for international criminal justice, as well as international relations.
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